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Diagnosis: from classification to prediction 
 
Abstract: 
Over the last two decades diagnostic labels have increasingly been sub-divided based on 
molecular and genetic ‘signatures’. But this emphasis on disease sub-types defined in 
molecular terms, elides the central role of population-based predictive technologies in 
determining these new diagnoses. While molecular diagnostic sub-types might flow from 
the laboratory, the clinical validity of every putative diagnostic category must ultimately be 
tested against its predictive powers. In effect, the former logic of prognosis following 
diagnosis is reversed. This paper explores the emergence of this new method of diagnostic 
practice over the last half century. 
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Cancer of the breast is a long-established clinical diagnosis. The malignant tumour increases 
in size, spreads to lymph nodes and then to the rest of the body. This singular diagnosis was 
challenged in 1967 when it was suggested there were in fact two types of breast cancer 
(Hems, 1967). A decade or so later the World Health Organisation (International histological 
classification of tumours, 1981) argued there were 14 types. A more recent review of breast 
cancer identified over 20 different ‘types’ supporting the contention that breast cancer was 
“a complex and heterogeneous disease, comprising multiple tumor entities associated with 
distinctive histological patterns and different biological features and clinical behaviors” 
(Weigelt & Reis-Filho, 2009, p. 718). In short, breast cancer was not “a single disease, but is 
instead a collection of diseases that have distinct histopathological features, genetic and 
genomic variability, and diverse prognostic outcomes” (Vargo-Gogola & Rosen, 2007, p. 
659). 
 
The term ‘diagnostic heterogeneity’ was introduced in the 1980s to describe the procession 
of sub-dividing diagnostic categories, a descriptor that captured the plurality of ‘conditions’ 
underlying any diagnosis. Recognition that heterogeneity characterised traditional unitary 
diagnoses marked a new way of constituting a disease label. Diseases had existed in a 
classification space or table with individual ‘cells’ (diagnoses) being added, subtracted or 
amended. Sometimes new diagnoses resulted from the discovery of new pathological 
entities. Sometimes diagnoses were merged when it was determined that they had the 
same underlying pathology as occurred when phthisis, scrofula and consumption were 
found to be all manifestations of tuberculosis. And sometimes diagnoses were split as in the 
identification of Type 1 and Type II diabetes early in the 20th century. All these diagnostic 
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innovations were the result of a more penetrating analysis of pathology, of the nature and 
causes of the biological processes underpinning the disease in question. What was new in 
the late 20th century concept of diagnostic heterogeneity, of disease segmentation, was the 
role of prediction in drawing the boundaries between new disease categories. While the 
classification of disease had been based on pathology, the new system for generating 
disease categories was constructed with reference to the future.  
 
In a study of medical textbooks published between 1892 and 1988, Christakis (1997) noted 
the gradual disappearance of concerns with and reference to prognosis, that is the future 
course of the disease diagnosed by the doctor. In part, he explained this ‘ellipsis’ in terms of 
an important shift in the ontological status of disease. Whereas in the 19th century the 
prognosis was highly dependent on the patient’s unique characteristics, especially their 
constitution, in the early 20th century it was believed that two patients could have the same 
disease whose natural course was a function of its pathological nature (Rosenberg, 2002). 
The prognosis of lobar pneumonia, for example (the medical focus of Christakis’ paper), was 
subsumed within the diagnosis itself and its ‘typical’ natural history. This process was 
promoted, according to Christakis, by the advent of antibiotics, an effective treatment for 
pneumonia, that further diminished the importance of considering prognosis as a separate 
analytic category. 
 
While prognosis might have almost disappeared from clinical thought and practice, there is 
evidence for its recent resurgence in the late 20th century as indicated by PubMed citations. 
Bourret, Keating and Cambrosio (2011) have argued that (clinical) prognosis and prediction 
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have distinct meanings with the former referring to ‘will the disease recur?’ and the latter 
‘will the disease react to treatment?’, this distinction being ascribed to ‘the (recent) 
emergence of molecular technologies’ (p.2) – though elsewhere they described this 
distinction as ‘often clouded’ in practice (Kohli-Laven, Bourret, Keating, & Cambrosio, 2011). 
The argument here, however, is that both terms now have a common basis derived not 
from molecular technologies but from patient populations and have therefore come to be 
used interchangeably. In other words, the idea of prognosis as a property of the pathology 
and its natural history, as described by Christakis, has been replaced by a future orientation. 
The latter is predicated on the late 20th century idea of a population in which the earlier 
enumeration of individuals has been superseded by the multiple and virtual populations 
that can be inferred from any patient characteristic (Armstrong, 2017). These (sub) 
populations provided the essential denominator for calculating differential prognoses. 
 
The argument for the claim that population-based prediction has begun to replace the role 
of pathology (and more recent molecular and genetic developments) in diagnostic practice 
is presented in three case studies. These are based on primary sources so that the 
‘conditions of possibility’ for emergence might be described rather than the social, political 
and economic explanations favoured by historians. Indeed, a logic of prediction may just as 
well be used to explain many of those same social, political and economic ‘influences’. 
Whether, say, the activities of the pharmaceutical industry are responsible for these 
changes or whether they simply exploit them is difficult to determine and is a discussion not 
pursued in this paper. The analysis here is an attempt at writing a genealogy of diagnosis, a 
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history of the present (Garland, 2014), that seeks to uncover the implicit logic sustaining 
diagnostic formation in recent decades. 
 
 The case studies are mainly based on searches of the medical literature (using resources 
such as JSTOR and PubMed, albeit restricted to English language publications) with 
reference to contemporary sociological literature where appropriate. Each case study – the 
boundary problem of hypertension, the process of staging cancers and the development of 
severity indices – provides an instance of when prediction began to undermine the older 
epistemology of pathological classification. While the latter two cases are marked by the 
beginning of a new process of diagnostic fragmentation, the first example concerns the 
struggle to maintain a distinct boundary around the pathology of hypertension. 
 
The boundaries of hypertension 
Until the end of the 19th century high blood pressure (hypertension) was diagnosed by 
placing a finger on the pulse at the wrist to ‘feel’ the tension. But with the invention of the 
sphygmomanometer it became possible to measure more precisely the underlying 
(diastolic) pressure in the patient’s arteries, together with the (systolic) pressure pulse 
caused by the beating heart. If the pressure was too high it could cause blood to burst out of 
an artery and haemorrhage into surrounding organs and tissues. The diagnosis of 
hypertension was complicated by the observation that blood pressure tended to rise with 




In 1926 US insurance companies pooled the blood pressure readings from 700,000 
applicants for life insurance to try and establish a more precise range of ‘normal’ pressures 
for different ages (Hunter, 1926). Insured populations, however, depended on who applied 
for life insurance and who was accepted; and they included those with pre-existing 
hypertension and those without. Insurance data was therefore “distorted” as no attempt 
was made “to separate normal from abnormal blood pressure groups in the statistical 
treatment” (Robinson & Brucer, 1939, p. 413). The problem was a circular one. To be able to 
identify the ‘normal’ range of blood pressures in a population the abnormal ones had first to 
be removed but the latter could only be identified once the normal range was defined.  
 
The challenge of defining the normal range of blood pressure was further explored in two 
major population-based initiatives in the second half of the 20th century, the Framingham 
Heart and the Build and Blood Pressure Studies. The Framingham Heart Study involved 
monitoring a population in a Massachusetts’ town to determine which levels of blood 
pressure would prove harmful in terms of subsequent cardiovascular disease. The first 
patient was recruited in 1948 and by 1957, with early results emerging, the investigators 
noted a nearly four-times increase in incidence of coronary heart disease for study 
participants with hypertension, defined as a blood pressure of 160/95 mm Hg or higher 
(Dawber, Moore, & Mann, 1957). A few years later, however, the Framingham investigators 
reported that ‘elevation of blood pressure’ – yet still within the normal range – was 
associated with an increased risk of the development of heart disease in certain age groups 
(Kannel, Dawber, Kagan, Revotskie, & Stokes, 1961, p. 40). This ‘elevated’ blood pressure 
was labelled ‘borderline hypertension’, a term first proposed in an earlier study that 
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suggested hypertension might be defined statistically as outside two standard deviations of 
the mean (Master, Dublin, & Marks, 1951). Yet while the label of borderline hypertension 
seemed to indicate some increased risk of heart disease, the report was clear that “Normal 
means not abnormal; it includes normotensive and borderline hypertension” (Kannel et al., 
1961, p. 44). 
 
Similar findings were reported by the Build and Blood Pressure Study (1959) of the Society 
of Actuaries based on a population of 3,900,000 insurance policy holders and 102,000 
deaths. It showed that mortality ratios were more markedly affected by blood pressure than 
earlier studies had indicated and that the risks extended into the accepted normal range. 
The analysis was still framed in terms of pathology: high blood pressure or hypertension 
could still be differentiated from normal blood pressure, the only question was exactly 
where that boundary should be drawn. And whereas the Framingham investigators had 
used the term borderline hypertension, the Build and Blood Pressure study suggested ‘mild 
hypertension’ to describe this indeterminate region between the pathological and the 
normal. 
 
So long as hypertension was viewed as a disease, as something pathological to be 
contrasted with a healthy ‘normal’ blood pressure, the boundary continued to be 
problematic. “Many terms have been proposed to describe borderline hypertension. 
Generally, the definition includes some discrimination between the severity (‘borderline’, 
‘mild’, ‘benign’) and the stability of the blood pressure (‘labile’, ‘occasional’, ‘transient’) … 
Confusing nomenclature and various definitions seriously interfere with meaningful 
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comparison of results of different investigators” (Julius & Schork, 1971, p. 746). What 
exactly was borderline hypertension? Was it even a specific entity? (Irving, Brash, Kerr, & 
Kirby, 1975). Should it be treated? (Lancet editorial, 1975). It was estimated that 18 million 
Americans had ‘marginal elevations in blood pressure’ and their management was ‘a 
perplexing problem’ (Julius, 1977). Patients in this no-man’s land between normality and 
disease existed where guidelines for intervention were not established given that the 
“specific boundaries between segments designated as severe, moderate, mild, or otherwise 
are more accidental and arbitrary in nature” (Labarthe, 1978, p. 12). 
 
By the late 1960s, the Framingham investigators were becoming more ambivalent about the 
usefulness of the hypertensive diagnostic label. They noted that knowledge of hypertension 
was based on clinical data derived from experience with clinical hypertensive disease, but 
their community study was largely based on early asymptomatic disease detected in the 
general population for which no guidelines existed. “An examination of the distribution of 
blood pressure in the general population fails to reveal any basis for selecting some critical 
value as the boundary between ‘normotension’ and ‘hypertension’ … the designation of 
some particular blood pressure value as ‘hypertension’ must of necessity be somewhat 
arbitrary” (Kannel, Castelli, McNamara, & Sorlie, 1969, pp. 118-9). This was the point at 
which hypertension, or rather the non-evaluative ‘blood pressure’, started to become a risk 
factor rather than a disease, a continuous variable located in a population of patients whose 
value was not underpinned by pathology but by its clinical consequences. Recognition that 
blood pressure need not be categorised as ‘hypertensive’ or ‘high’ or ‘raised’ but rather 
treated as a continuous scale then enabled its incorporation into linear coefficients that 
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aggregated several risk factors as predictive markers of cardiovascular disease or mortality 
(Truett, Cornfield, & Kannel, 1967).  
 
The boundary between pathology and normality continued to be a focus of medical enquiry 
whether in terms of borderline or mild hypertension or, more recently, prehypertension 
(Moser, 2004). Successive clinical trials gradually lowered the blood pressure levels at which 
health benefits of treatment could be detected. The SPRINT trial (SPRINT Research Group, 
2015) of intensive blood pressure control, for example, claimed that reducing the systolic 
pressure to less than 120mg Hg – well within the historical ‘normal range’ – conferred 
health benefits. Clinical guidelines identified a new Stage 1 hypertension in place of the old 
prehypertension which, controversially, increased the proportion of US adults who might 
benefit from treatment from 32% to 46% (Bakris & Sorrentino, 2018). These shifts in blood 
pressure treatment advice indicated a convergence of concepts of risk and disease as 
former borderline conditions became eligible for treatment (Aronowitz, 2009). Indeed, the 
consequences of equating at risk status with illness has important consequences for turning 
preventive activity into treatment and the subsequent medicalisation of previously ‘healthy’ 
patients (Kreiner & Hunt, 2014). But while there are debates about whether a ‘disease’ or a 
‘risk factor’ is being over-diagnosed or over-treated (Moynihan, 2012; Martin, Boucher, 
Wright, & Saini, 2014) and whether blood pressure should be dichotomised or treated as a 
continuous variable in risk assessment (Will, 2005), the underlying logic was that a 




High blood pressure was one of the first clinical diagnoses to illustrate the new approach to 
classification. The significance of a ‘blood pressure’ label lay not in its anatomical or 
physiological characteristics and even less in any underlying pathological process – in a way 
these were irrelevant to its identification – but in future risks that established a continuous 
scale of potential harms. The very idea of a risk factor had emerged from the Framingham 
cohort (Kannel et al, 1961) as risk could only be derived from a population rather than from 
an individual patient. The risk coefficients that have subsequently been developed have 
inverted the usual temporal ordering of diagnosis assuming and determining prognosis. 
Instead, the ‘prognosis’, in this case the mortality resulting from any risk factor, could be 
used to validate the significance of that risk factor. Blood pressure provided a model for 
how types, stages and levels of ‘disease’ could be calibrated against future health rather 




The concept of staging had been applied in the earlier part of the 20th century to surgical 
operations which used two step interventions to reduce post-surgery mortality. But in the 
second half of the century staging became more commonly used to describe the 
penetration of cancer into the patient’s organs and tissues. It was apparent that cancer 
started from a small number of cells then spread (metastasised) around the body. 
Identifying how far the cancer cells had spread was important for determining the extent of 
the disease progression, and therefore likely prognosis, as well as indicating the appropriate 




A number of methods for staging cancers were developed in the immediate post-War years 
(Craver, 1947; Peters, 1950) but the most influential system was based on the extent of the 
primary tumour (T), the state of the regional lymph nodes (N), and the presence or absence 
of distant metastases (M) (Harmer, 1964). During the 1950s this classification system 
became widely recognised and over the following decade its reach extended to cancers at 
many different sites (Sellars, 1966). In all cases, the TNM score indicated the extent the 
cancer had grown and spread as well as giving a guide as to the most appropriate treatment 
(surgery, for example, was too late for tumours that had metastasised) (Jelliffe & Thomson, 
1955). 
 
Once one patient’s cancer stage could be compared with another’s, clinicians could 
communicate more clearly and begin to align their treatments to the defined stage of the 
disease. Different treatments could also be better evaluated by ensuring comparisons were 
based on standardised assessment of the disease phase (Newall, 1967). More significantly, 
the new staging system in cancer began a process of segmenting diagnoses. For cancers of 
the breast, for example, each component – T, N, and M – could be sub-divided into 
gradations, according to its stage of progression. Thus, T1, T2, T3, and T4 represented 
degrees of advance in the primary tumour, Nb, Nc, and Nd represented degrees of advance 
in the local lymph nodes while the extent of distant metastases could be represented by 
M1, M2, M3, and M4. A patient might have ‘breast cancer’ but the staging diagnosis meant 




The initial process of cancer staging was based on a morphological/pathological 
classification in which the cancer was usually designated histologically as a cellular type, and 
then examined for whether it was anatomically localized, regionally extensive or distantly 
disseminated. The correspondence with outcome was not always accurate as some early 
stage cancers could progress rapidly while those at a later stage might develop slowly. The 
solution, as with the problem of blood pressure, was to start reversing the relationship 
between disease and its outcome. Instead of a stage being based on analysis of the spread 
of malignant cells, putative stages and cancer sub-types could be validated by their ability to 
predict outcome. Certainly, the idea of a cancer stage had implied a likely prognosis but the 
heterogeneity in outcomes of any particular stage could only be resolved by recalibrating 
the stage on the basis of adjustment from directly measured outcomes – leading to the 
derivation of further sub-types. 
 
For some cancers a staging ‘scale’ was reconstructed and new variables were added to the 
model especially if these had a significant bearing on prognosis. The Gleason score for 
prostate cancer, for example, was first developed in the 1960s and 1970s by classifying cells 
by their pathological ‘stage’, from low-grade/normal to high-grade/aggressive. It was 
revised in 2005 and again in 2014, not on the basis of new investigations in pathology or the 
molecular laboratory nor on observations in clinical practice, but on its predictive value in a 
population. The 2014 revision, for instance, was tested and validated against 20,000 
prostatectomy specimens and at least 16,000 biopsy samples to produce a 5-point Gleason 
Grade grouping that denoted a prognostically distinct stratification, from number 1 
indicating lowest-risk cancer to 5 the most aggressive disease (Epstein et al., 2016). Similar 
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revisions were carried out for colon cancer and cervical cancer. Indeed, there were 14 
references to cancer scoring systems in PubMed prior to 1980 but over 1,600 in the first 
decade of the following century. 
 
The spread of screening services brought the early stages of cancer growth into greater 
focus. Many patients were diagnosed with ‘carcinoma in situ’, seemingly non-invasive cells 
undergoing changes that might lead to cancer. For the pathologist these changes were often 
subtle and difficult to distinguish from actively growing tissue (BMJ editorial, 1955). Many 
patients undergoing breast or cervical cancer screening, for example, were found to have 
‘cell dysplasia’, some indeterminate changes from normal, or ‘carcinoma in situ’ 
characterised by possible cancer cells that had not spread. The CIN (Cervical Intraepithelial 
Neoplasia) nomenclature in cervical cancer screening placed all pre-malignant abnormalities 
into a single diagnostic scoring system ranging from mild dysplasia (CIN 1) to ‘carcinoma-in-
situ’ (CIN 3). Even then there were calls to recognise ‘borderline CIN’ when CIN 1 was 
uncertain (Fox & Buckley, 1990). 
 
‘Borderline’ findings might indicate a form of pre-cancer but how should it be treated? 
Would ‘abnormal’ cells grow further, and would their early removal prevent later invasive 
disease? The question could not be settled by histology but required examining populations 
of women to determine the significance of traditional staging, tumour biology and effect of 
treatment on prognosis (Saadatmand, Bretveld, Siesling, & Tilanus-Linthors, 2015). If there 
was debate about the status of in situ cancer it was only because the findings from 




Initially, cancer staging had fragmented cancer diagnoses into sub-types based on the 
natural history of the underlying pathology but with the introduction of prognosis as a 
validating method, these sub-types began to proliferate to reflect the divergent futures of 
cancers even at the same TNM stage. In effect, as with hypertension, and at about the same 
time, cancer began to be categorised in terms of its likely prognosis. A similar process of 
initial diagnostic fragmentation followed by the application of a prognostic analytic 
framework also characterised other non-cancer diagnoses where the initial concern was 
with disease severity. 
 
Severity indices 
About the middle of the 20th century it became apparent that claims for the benefits of 
treatment were often based on invalid comparisons. Some treatments seemed better than 
others simply because they were used in less severe cases. In diabetic coma, for example, 
the patient’s state of consciousness and age seemed to affect mortality rates so that the 
effect of a therapy on two groups of patients could not easily be compared. The solution 
was a Severity Index that “will permit comparison of experiences of one clinic with those of 
another with a reasonable degree of accuracy and thus afford a means of evaluating 
different methods of treatment in the future” (Rabinowitch, Fowler, & Bensley, 1939, p. 
1424). Calculation of the diabetic coma Severity Index involved scoring on a five-point scale 
those variables known to affect mortality and adding them together. A few years later 
Collen (1942) added other variables that were known to affect mortality (such as the 
duration of the coma) to the Severity Index to improve its accuracy. Later still, Zieve and Hill 
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(1953) more formally analysed the discriminative power of each severity variable and, 
weighting each accordingly, showed the resulting single severity score was more accurate at 
predicting mortality than earlier simple summations. 
 
The construction of severity indices multiplied in the second half of the 20th century with the 
aim of ensuring comparable groups of patients could be created for evaluating 
interventions. A severity index for hypertension could provide a bench-mark for judging 
whether a treatment was successful or not (Palmer, Loofbourow, & Doering, 1948); a 
‘Pathologic Index Rating’ for patients with myocardial infarction enabled the effect of 
treatment to be more reliably assessed as patients with disease of similar severity could be 
compared (Schnur, 1953); a severity index for patients with hyaline-membrane disease 
could “facilitate evaluation of modifications of or additions to current regimens of 
treatment” (Stahlman, Battersby, Shepard, & Blankenship, 1967, p. 306); or for patients in 
shock after attempting suicide by drug overdose an index could be used “with particular 
reference to the effect of specific therapeutic interventions” (Afifi, Sacks, Liu, Weil, & 
Shubin, 1971, p. 502). Even in the face of increasing use of randomisation to generate 
comparable groups (Cochrane, 1972), severity indices were still held to have value. The 
Coronary Prognostic Index, for example, “should provide a valuable method for assessing 
randomisation in any properly designed trial which is aimed at comparing the progress of 
treated patients with those in a control group” (Norris, Brandt, Caughey, Lee, & Scott, 1969, 
p. 278). Severity scores, moreover, could be used for stratification to augment the 




While the main purpose of measures of disease severity was to enable the assembly of 
equivalent patient groups for testing the value of interventions, severity was clearly related 
to prognosis as less severe or less advanced disease had a longer course to run. Sometimes, 
therefore, a severity index was described as a prognostic index. But at first there seemed 
little realisation that the analysis could easily be inverted: instead of severity indicating 
prognosis, prognosis could validate severity. That inversion began as a new focus on 
predictive power emerged. Previously “adjectives and adverbs rather than quantitative 
data” had underpinned prognosis; now “With the recent publication of mathematical 
expressions for the likelihood that a patient with a myocardial infarction will survive acutely 
and chronically, medicine took a large step forward in replacing verbal with quantitative 
description” (Bleich, 1971, p. 1533). It was the emerging indices and scoring systems that 
marked out the new diagnostic method: if the number assigned a disease or disease sub-
type was based on its prognosis then that number was, almost by definition, a prognostic 
indicator. This number could then, working in reverse, validate a new disease sub-type or 
risk factor. Diagnosis therefore began to shift from an examination of pathologies (mostly by 
cellular though later by molecular techniques) to an investigation of prognoses based on 
predictive population technologies. 
 
Although risk factors, cancer staging and severity indices had all originated in a conceptual 
universe dominated by pathology and pathological diagnoses, by the closing decades of the 
20th century all three areas had been reoriented towards prognosis. The former discrete 
diagnostic labels based on an underlying ‘disease’ began a process of fragmentation that 
reflected smaller increments of risk. In this way, some diseases shifted towards becoming a 
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continuous scale – a blood pressure, a cancer stage, grade or score, a severity index – on 
which patients could be located with each step signifying a worsening prognosis. At the 
same time, the scale began to extend to incorporate more and more ‘normal’ patients. And 
because for any disease there were many possible futures, the potential for undermining 
the distinct pathological diagnostic categories of the present was considerable. 
 
Diagnostic heterogeneity 
The term ‘translational research’ emerged in the early 1990s to describe the process of 
moving basic laboratory research into the clinic. In the case of diagnosis, this involved the 
revitalisation of an older tradition of pathology with identification of molecular and genetic 
‘signatures’ underpinning disease sub-types. Yet, ironically, despite diagnostic sub-divisions 
being expressed in molecular and genetic terms, they were in fact rooted in a completely 
different technology, namely the predictive power that derived from using population 
denominators. Pathology and the molecular laboratory produced ‘candidate’ molecular 
diagnoses, but they only entered clinical practice if they could be validated by predicting an 
endpoint in a clinical population. Indeed, the recent history of medicine is littered with 
thousands of molecular markers of disease that have failed to prove of any predictive value 
(Diamandis, 2012; Ioannidis & Bossuyt, 2017; Ioannidis & Tzoulaki, 2011; Kern, 2012). An 
extended classification system that, for example, suggested breast cancer might be sub-
divided by gene expression profiling could only become part of the oncologist’s diagnostic 
repertoire if the new sub-types had implications for the future course of the disease. But 
most laboratory speculations ended in failure: “Thousands of studies of putative prognostic 
or predictive markers have failed to identify useful molecular markers in tumors [because 
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they could not] predict the outcome in an individual patient with cancer or the response of 
an individual tumor to specific therapies” (Sauter & Simon, 2002, p. 1995). 
 
The apparent molecular trend in recent diagnostic heterogeneity has therefore concealed 
the importance of a population-based predictive context. To be sure, molecular and genetic 
scientists/pathologists have generated innumerable diagnostic sub-divisions; theirs is a 
machine for fragmenting former unitary diagnoses as gross pathology and cellular histology 
is divided and sub-divided. But each one of these new putative diagnoses cannot enter the 
clinic without first passing through the evaluation gateway of the population-based 
predictive challenge (often in the form of a cohort study, a diagnostic accuracy test or a 
clinical trial). If a new genetic signature has no clinical significance in terms of predicting life 
expectancy, the clinical course of the disease or the most appropriate treatment then it 
failed to ‘leave’ the laboratory. Despite the apparent origin of stratified or precision 
medicine in the molecular laboratory, it is only realised through its accuracy in predicting 
outcomes in clinical populations. 
 
Whereas in the past, treatment could influence prognosis, in the new regime prognosis (of a 
diagnostic sub-type) indicated treatment. Some patients responded to a treatment, others 
did not. Patients could therefore be sub-divided by their ‘treatment responsiveness’. “Breast 
cancer is not a single disease but a group of several important tumor subtypes, each with a 
different natural history and each requiring a different treatment” (Burstein, 2005, p. 1652). 
A new type of diagnosis could then emerge: ‘treatment resistant’ disease, based not on 
pathology but on whether patients were ‘responders’ or ‘non-responders’ to treatment. 
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Drug-resistant syphilis, tuberculosis or depression, antimicrobial resistant infections, 
refractory ‘difficult-to-control’ hypertension or resistance to cancer chemotherapy were all 
identified through working backwards, from the outcome to the diagnosis. 
 
The decline and rebirth of prognosis 
In some ways prognosis is a term that belongs to a declining medical logic (Christakis, 1997), 
one that projects forward from the pathology, from the diagnostic label, with all the 
uncertainty that entails. The more recent approach, however, is perhaps better described as 
being underpinned by reverse prediction in which the outcome determines the diagnosis. 
This shift not only challenges the medical epistemological landscape but also changes 
clinical practice and begins to undermine a pathology-based diagnostic classification system.  
 
Overall, there have been three major new approaches to diagnosis that were all 
underpinned by a temporal dimension. The first was prognosis/prediction. Different 
patients with the same disease often had different outcomes: some died, some lived, some 
recovered quickly, some diseases became chronic. Diagnosis could therefore be refashioned 
around these outcomes so that any illness categorisation more accurately reflected that 
predicted endpoint. Whether these ‘diagnoses’ were framed as risk factors or disease sub-
types (Aronowitz, 2009), the effect was little different: each was predicated on a future 
trajectory. Given the range of possible outcomes this implied that the singular pathological 
diagnosis could fragment into increasing numbers of sub-types. Secondly, the presence of 
risk factors could be confirmed by their association with outcomes and the resulting 
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individual variables could further be clustered into prognostic indices or syndromes. Such 
risk factors, unlike pathological processes, had no necessary causal relationship with illness 
rather, like biomarkers, it was their role in prediction that validated their clinical utility. 
Finally, it was known that the response to treatment varied considerably between different 
patients. Treatment-resistant or treatment-recalcitrant disease therefore became an 
important sub-type of many diagnostic labels.  
 
These three new diagnostic principles – prediction, risk factor clustering and treatment-
responsiveness – have offered an alternative to the old classification systems over the last 
few decades. The flat diagnostic classificatory table could be transformed by introducing a 
temporal dimension in terms of the preceding risk factor of the disease and its likely 
temporal course with and without treatment. A diagnosis was no longer therefore a cell in a 
(pathological) classification table but an assignment to a ‘population’ of patients with similar 
prognostic trajectories. If such a population could not be identified then prognosis might 
remain unstated (Timmermans & Stivers, 2018).  
 
For a system of clinical medicine that had relied on clinical skills to classify pathologies these 
new techniques were alien, as they were based on studies that identified population, sub-
populations and sub-sub-populations. The fragmentation of formerly unitary diagnoses was 
not therefore a continuation of a clinical method for identifying new diseases but rather a 
different way of constructing diagnoses. A patient might be presented with a diagnosis of, 
say, breast cancer but the important question is ‘what type?’. Some types are aggressive 
and deadly; in other cases the patient is likely to die with the cancer rather than from it; 
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some types are susceptible to the latest monoclonal antibodies while others show no 
response. Even these types have little stability as with more longitudinal studies and more 
therapeutic evaluations, sub-types will continue to change and proliferate. The very 
language of medicine reflects these changes. Severity and prognostic indices, staging, 
disease sub-types and diagnostic heterogeneity are all terms belonging to the period of 
transition as a new temporal future emerged that provided the techniques for illness 
identification in the present.  
 
Over the last decade the sociology of diagnosis has come into increasing prominence (Jutel, 
2009; McGann & Hutson, 2011; Jutel & Nettleton, 2011). “Diagnoses are the classification 
tools of medicine” claimed Jutel (2009, p. 278): “Diagnosis defines the field of medicine and 
its professional reach, serves as the nexus in which the clinical encounter takes place, 
arbitrates normality and difference, organises a patient’s illness, and determines how 
resources are allocated” (p. 294). According to this schema, diagnosis places patients in a 
classificatory frame that then determined treatment and prognosis. Yet, as argued above, 
while this classification frame has recently been sub-divided and segmented seemingly on 
the basis, as of old, of pathology, albeit increasingly molecular, this new apparently 
reductionist classificatory process is in fact premised on contexts far removed from the 
molecular laboratory. It is this new focus on the future as engendered by a population-
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